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Justice Roberts’ America

Less than a week after the Roberts Court issued its decision in National Federation of
Independent Business v Sebelius, Jeffrey Toobin, writing in The New Yorker, compared the first
part of Chief Justice John Roberts's opinion, in which he found that the Commerce Clause did
not authorize Congress to enact the "individual mandate" section of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) that requires all individuals to buy health insurance, with an Ayn Rand screed, noting
that the pivotal sections of the argument were long on libertarian rhetoric but short on citations of
authority. Roberts held (although "held" might be stating it too strongly) that the Commerce
Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate the inactivity of individuals — the "act" of not
buying health insurance — even if that inactivity impacts interstate commerce. Rather, the
Clause only authorizes congressional regulation where there is some activity of a commercial
nature there to be regulated. Injecting a dose of libertarian and individualist thinking more
typically associated with the Lochner-era's substantive due process jurisprudence into
Commerce Clause reasoning, Roberts argued that the inactivity of not buying insurance is
tantamount to doing nothing, and doing nothing cannot be characterized as commercial activity
even if it has a commercial impact.
Should inactivity, as opposed to activity, suffice to trigger congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause, the result would be a slippery slope: if inactivity suffices for constitutional
purposes, it is hard to imagine what does not suffice. Therefore, it is hard to establish the limits
of Congress's power to regulate individual behavior. At the end of this slippery slope, as Justice
Antonin Scalia also complained, Congress could presumably require us to buy broccoli in order
to improve our diets, or to buy cars so as to save the auto industry or to pitch in and grow wheat
in our back yards for resale so as to bring down the price of bread during a famine. Indeed, our
individual lives could be regulated by Congress from "cradle to grave," Roberts complained —
the bare fact of our existence, after all, has some impact on commerce. If Roberts's argument is
taken to be authoritative, there are now limits on the Commerce Clause that protect our
individual liberty not to do the sorts of commercial activities that might otherwise trigger the
regulatory powers of the federal government -- although, importantly, this is not true of the state
governments, whose police powers have no such limits.
Toobin correctly notes that this pivotal move in Roberts's Commerce Clause argument — that
Congress cannot regulate inactivity simply by virtue of its impact on interstate commerce — was
made without reference to any authority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting from this part
of Roberts's decision, makes the same observation: although Roberts may be correct that the
ACA is the first congressional act to ground its Commerce Clause authority in inactivity rather
than activity, he cites no authority for the proposition that this is fatal to its constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause. Neither Roberts nor Scalia provide precedent or argument for this
claim, beyond their intuitions regarding the slippery slopes of cars, wheat and broccoli. That is
likely because there is no such authority to cite. As Toobin and countless other commentators
have suggested, there simply is no precedential authority for the claim that inactivity that impacts
interstate commerce cannot be regulated, on the sole ground that it is inactivity rather than
activity. From whence, then, comes this distinction between activity and inactivity? Why,

Ginsburg asks in her dissent, is it so important to Roberts and Scalia that an individual's conduct
must be capable of being characterized as activity, rather than inactivity, in order for its effects
on commerce to justify congressional power? Why are we creating a cocoon around individual
inactivity to protect it against the specter of federal legislators? Ginsburg leaves the question
unanswered.
But it is not unanswerable. I believe that what Ginsburg fails to note, and what other
commentators likewise have missed, is precisely what Toobin mentions off-handedly in his
piece: it is dystopic imagery, not precedent or argument, that drives this conviction that the
Commerce Clause does not authorize the regulation of inactivity. If the government had its way,
the "hale and hearty" individual's inactivity could trigger the federal government's nannyistic
meddling with his life, and could do so from "cradle to grave." It could — and therefore
presumably would — require him to buy broccoli "to improve [his] diets," to buy a car "to save
Detroit," to grow wheat to drive up the price of endangered farms or whatever else the
government gets in its collective head to require people to do in pursuit of its intrusive ends. The
Randian individual who wants nothing so much as the freedom to choose not to participate in
these collectivist projects would not be allowed his passive-aggressive atomism should the
government's argument prevail. The opinions of both Roberts and Scalia turn repeatedly to this
imagery of healthy individuals up against unduly paternalist legislators who are obsessed with
the country's collective diet, driving habits and health. Given these self-evidently horrific images,
there is little need for legalism, precedent or authority — the slippery slope speaks for itself. The
Commerce Clause prong of the decision, then, rests at bottom on a vision, or as Roberts puts it at
one point, on a view of our "Constitutional order" (in another telling passage, on the
"Constitution's spirit"). The decision may be dictated by the rule of law, but it is not a "rule of
law" that requires precedent, a law of rules, internal consistency or integrity. Rather, it is a rule
of law that is bound to a particular interpretation of our constitutional order that protects the
individual's isolationist inclinations over the federal government's unquenchable collectivist
regulatory thirst.
Given the rhetoric, and the force with which it is articulated, there is little that is puzzling about
the details. It is not so puzzling, for example, that Roberts does not "explain" why he places
weight on the distinction between activity and inactivity. The image of the government having
the right to regulate every aspect of our lives solely because we are sitting in a chair doing
nothing is compelling enough to trigger the Court's impulse to protect us against such a
devouring source of centralized power. It is even less puzzling why Roberts is so untroubled by
the "collective action" problem that prompted Congress to pass the mandate in the first place,
and fails to grapple with it as marking a meaningful distinction between the mandate and his
parade of horribles. According to the government's argument, given community pricing and the
requirement that insurers provide services to those with pre-existing conditions, without a
mandate requiring healthy individuals to purchase insurance, such individuals will choose not to
insure unless and until they become sick. This will drive up the price of care and premiums, both
for them and the rest of us. Against the backdrop of the Court's rhetoric, this hardly counsels for
the constitutionality of the ACA. Rather, the dragooning of the "inactive individual" as a
conscripted soldier against a "collective action" problem that besets the masses is the
constitutional horror. That there is a "collective action problem" here ironically underscores the
constitutional infirmity with its solution.

So the rhetoric in this section is powerful; so powerful as to take the argumentative place of
precedent. But does it matter? Are Roberts and Scalia's Randian constitutional musings of any
consequence? The mandate was, after all, upheld as a fully constitutional tax by the same Court
and in the same case, under Congress’s taxing power. Roberts's rhetorical excoriation of the
mandate for its attempt to dragoon the inactive individual into collective action against his will
is, technically, dicta; because the mandate is upheld on other grounds, the Court's discovery of
this limit to the reach of the Commerce Clause is not logically necessary to the outcome. The
entire discussion may also be inconsequential for a second reason: there are few instances in
which Congress seeks to regulate inactivity by "mandating" the purchase of a product. Counsel
for both sides were hard pressed to come up with any additional examples, or even hypotheticals,
beyond the ACA's mandate itself. As several commentators have noted, the restrictions
suggested by their dicta on the reach of the Commerce Clause might be more than compensated
by the expansive reading of the taxing power endorsed by Roberts and the four liberal Justices in
the Court's holding: if a regulatory end that targets inactivity cannot be sustained through the
Commerce Clause, perhaps it can be sustained as a tax, even if it is not called that (at least if
there are penalties attached for the non-complying inactivity, and if the penalties are collected by
the Internal Revenue Service). Perhaps, then, given the overriding narrative — that this
conservative Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of a major new social welfare initiative
— the liberal handwringing over Roberts's and Scalia's essays on Commerce Clause
jurisprudence are misguided. Their anti-welfarist libertarian musings are just of no consequence.
Nevertheless, even if it is "just rhetoric," rhetoric from high sources matters. The rhetoric in the
Commerce Clause section of Roberts's opinion in this case in particular matters hugely, and for
two reasons.
First, Roberts's finding, albeit in dicta, that individuals must be free to not participate in the
nation's attempt to provide health coverage for the working poor obliquely suggests the contours
of a newly recognized individual right: a right to be free of federal regulation of one's inactivity,
even where that inactivity negatively impacts societal and commercial ends. Because the federal
government has no power to regulate such individual inactivity, the individual has the right to his
inactivity free of the specter of undue federal regulation, even if that inactivity proves deleterious
to nationally defined social efforts to resolve society-wide economic problems. That new "right
to inactivity", in short, neatly exemplifies what I believe to be an emerging rights paradigm on
the conservative right, both on and off the Court, which I have elsewhere called "exit rights": the
rights of individuals to exit the webs of mutual obligation and shared responsibility that
collectively constitute civil society. Exit rights are rights, in effect, to exit the changing and
shifting obligations of the social compact. Federation of Business v Sebelius explicitly articulates
the grounds for such rights, even without naming them: the Constitution defines a government of
limited and enumerated powers and individual citizens must not be subjected to centralized
overbearing authority. Given those premises, the federal government has no power, in the guise
of regulating commerce, to order the participation of hale and hearty individuals in federally
conceived and funded social welfare programs. The individual has a right, then, where the
government has no power to command otherwise, to not obtain health insurance for himself,
even if doing so is irrational, doing otherwise would contribute to the collective health of the
polity and his refusal to do so raises the cost of health coverage for all. Stated positively and

more generally, the individual has the right to "exit" a collective attempt to resolve a civic
problem through the democratic levers of civil society.
The right to exit obliquely recognized here is not unlike other recently conceived (or
dreamt of) libertarian rights. It is structurally similar, for example, to the express right the Court
created from the Second Amendment in their decisions in District of Columbia v.
Heller and McDonald v. Chicago: an individual right to defend oneself with lethal force, and to
thereby withdraw from, or exit, the collective, civic delegation to police forces of the work of
protecting us all from social violence. The Court declared in those cases that the individual has a
"right" to provide his own protection against the violence of others, and to use lethal force if
need be against intruders. Thus, by virtue of those decisions, the individual now has the right to
"exit" from those parts of the Hobbesian and Lockean social compact by which we delegate to
police forces both the power and the responsibility to protect us. By virtue of this decision in
Federation of Business v. Sebelius, the individual also has the right to exit the compact by which
we collectively defray the health related costs of ourselves and co-citizens through insurance
programs. Along similar lines, libertarian, religious and social conservative parents' groups over
the last few decades have fervently struggled to articulate a right of parents to withdraw from the
shared civic project of public education and educate their children at home. That effort has had
considerable success, both with lower federal courts and with state legislatures.
These new rights — a right to lethal self defense and to own the means to carry it out, a
right not to buy insurance where doing so would resolve a collective health care crisis and a right
to "home school" free of all state regulation — collectively suggest the imagining of a new rights
paradigm. They are not just liberal rights of self-expression. They are radically and, I believe,
deeply tragic anti-collectivist rights to exit core parts of the civic compact, usually by inactivity
— not buying insurance, not sending one's children to school, not surrendering the means of
one's own self protection to a police force — that undermines, sometimes near fatally, the civic
attempt to solve collective problems collectively through the project of government. The children
in public schools suffer when the parents of over two million children claim a right to
"homeschool," thereby justifying diminished resources for education and sacrificing parental and
communal good will. All of us, including the police, are endangered by the proliferation of
weaponry among citizens when half the country is armed. And the insured, as well as uninsured,
are impoverished by the refusal of the healthy to participate in an insurance mandate that would
reduce costs for all.
These exit rights, unlike liberal rights of self-expression and autonomy, are protective not
of individuals' inclinations toward expression and political participation, but rather of
individuals' inclinations toward isolation and atomism. This protection exacts an often extreme
cost from not only particular collectivist ends, but to the idea of governance itself. The rhetoric in
this opinion, even if dicta, matters because it explicitly gives these rights the imprimatur of
constitutionality, as envisioned by the highest Court of the land. As Ronald
Dworkin noted nearly half a century ago, the conception or understanding of individual rights
that is embraced by the Supreme Court at any particular moment — whether they be civil rights
of nondiscrimination, political rights of democratic participation, liberal rights of free speech,
assembly, autonomy, or reproductive freedoms, or, as here, what I call "exit rights" that insulate
atomistic individuals from collectivist projects, including the projects of co-insurance, public

education or state-provided police protection — can reshape a country in profound and enduring
ways.
Second, charged political rhetoric from Supreme Court justices, even in dicta, matters, because
that dicta purports to authoritatively state, on the basis of the Constitution, who we are and what
we can and cannot do as a nation. The Court's answer to this question of national identity
particularly matters where, as here, its answer, ostensibly driven by the dictates of the
Constitution in turn drafted by the metaphorical "We the People," is so radically at odds with the
vision implied by the actual will of the people as expressed through the representative branches
of government. In this case, that incompatibility is manifest: the mandate, enacted by a
democratically elected branch, after a presidential and congressional campaign that focused
squarely on the issue for many months, expresses quite clearly the people's conviction that free
riders in health insurance markets can and should be made to contribute to the cost of their own
care, while the Court expresses quite clearly its view that no such mandate should be issued.
Roberts held that this law of the people, a law that had the audacity to require that
individuals obtain health insurance so as to help defray general health care costs, violated the
letter and spirit of the Constitution. According to this opinion, the will to do that — the will to
enact such a law, demanding the mutual shouldering of costs — was at odds with who we
constitutionally are, and when that happens, democratic deliberation and its product must fall to
the imperative demands of our adjudicated constitutional identity. Who we are, as adjudged by
this authoritative judicial rendering, is a country that cannot or will not collectively regulate the
health industry, so as to protect the weaker among us, even should we want to and even should
we decide to do just that. Who we are, according to the constitutional order envisioned by
Roberts, is a country that must protect the atomistic contrarian decisions of the hale and hearty,
even though they did not prevail at the ballot box, and even though, to borrow the artful language
of Ginsburg's powerful dissent, we thereby sacrifice the health of the working people whose
labor supports us all. It is important to note, however, that we the people did not author this
particular self-portrait.

